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Chapter 9 
 
The life of Aristippus in the Socratic Epistles: Three interpretations 
Kurt Lampe 
 
Sometime in the second or third century CE an anonymous epistolographer authored a series 
of letters purporting to pass between Socrates’ followers after his death. The most interesting 
of these are ascribed to Aristippus, who was the notional founder of the sceptical and 
hedonistic Cyrenaic school of philosophy. Among the key sources for these letters were the 
collections of anecdotes and sayings which Momigliano has called the ‘truest antecedents of 
biography and autobiography,’1 which continued to make up the bulk of many works actually 
entitled ‘lives of the philosophers’ in this period.2 It is this biographical aspect of 
pseudepistolography which merits a discussion of these letters in the present volume. 
Aristippus does not discuss philosophical theories, but rather his own lifestyle and that of his 
addressees. This distinction between lifestyle and theory turns out to occupy a prominent 
place in the scholarship on the historical Aristippus, where it is also presented through the 
dichotomy between ‘performance’ or ‘art’ and ‘science’. The Socratic epistles afford us an 
opportunity to re-examine these dichotomies. The goal of this chapter is therefore to explore 
several ways in which, while imagining Aristippus’ discussion of his ‘artful’ lifestyle, the 
epistolographer permits us to reconstruct and evaluate an Aristippean philosophy.  
 
I. THE EPISTLES AND EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP ON ARISTIPPEAN ETHICS  
I will begin by offering a provisional reading of ethics in the epistles. There are two guiding 
questions for this section. First, how can these letters contribute to existing scholarship on 
Aristippean philosophy? Second, what sort of ethics does Aristippus defend and display in 
these letters? In order to motivate these questions, it is first necessary to offer an overview of 
the relevant passages. 
 Though Aristippus is the author, recipient, or subject of 11 of the 35 epistles, I will be 
focusing on epistles 8 through 13, which provide the most detailed and coherent portrait. In 
                                                 
1 (1971) 23. 
2 On biographies of philosophers and the anecdotal tradition, see Tsouna-McKirahan (1994) 
387-91; Mann (1996) 105-12; Mansfeld (1994) 179-91; Branham (1989) 58-63; Goldhill 
(2009) 96-113.  
letter 8 Antisthenes, who was famed in antiquity for his austerity, writes from Athens to 
Aristippus, who is living it up in the court of Dionysius II of Syracuse.3 Antisthenes writes, 
‘The philosopher isn’t someone who stays with tyrants and devotes himself to Sicilian tables, 
but rather someone who lives in his own country and desires only what’s sufficient’ (p. 
244.1-3 Malherbe4). He urges Aristippus to cure his sybaritic impulses with hellebore, which 
today we know as an emetic, abortefacient and poison, and the ancients represent as a cure 
for everything from melancholia to imprudence.5 Aristippus responds in letter 9 with 
profound irony, thanking Antisthenes for his concern, craving his pity for his pathological 
hedonism and congratulating Antisthenes on his healthier devotion to pure water, barley 
bread and a single filthy garment.  
 Letters 10 and 11 comprise a brief exchange between Aeschines and Aristippus, in 
which the former asks Aristippus to intercede on behalf of some Locrians who are in trouble 
with Dionysius, and Aristippus assures him he’ll take care of everything. But ‘don’t tell 
Antisthenes if I’ve saved your friends’, he asks in letter 11, ‘since he doesn’t like having 
tyrants for friends, preferring to seek out barley-sellers and tavern-keepers’ (248.13-6).  
 There follows a complaint against Aristippus from Simon the Cobbler. ‘I hear you’ve 
been mocking my wisdom with Dionysius’, he writes in letter 12. ‘Well, I admit I’m a 
cobbler, this is the work I do. All the same, if necessary I’d even cut leather straps to instruct 
fools who think, against the advice of Socrates, that they should live luxuriously’ (250.1-7). 
Once again, Aristippus responds ironically, advising the leather-cutter it would be more 
profitable to cut straps for fashionable Syracusan shoes than for whipping lapsed 
philosophers. ‘Don’t you realize’, he adds in letter 13, ‘that by always wearing shoes I 
magnify your business? But Antisthenes always goes barefoot! What does he accomplish 
other than taking away your work and profit, since he persuades the young and all the 
Athenians to go barefoot? So consider what a good friend I am by embracing comfort and 
pleasure’ (251.29-252.2).   
                                                 
3 Dionysius II reigned ca. 367-56 and 346-44 BCE. As Obens (1912) 19-20, Köhler (1923) 103 and 
Sykutris (1933) 50-51 agree, the fictional date of letters 10-11 is 361 BCE. I presume letters 8-9 share 
this date. 
4 I use the page and line numbering from (Malherbe 1977).  
5 In fact Theophrastus recognizes two sorts of hellebore, black and white, which have different 
properties (Hist. pl. 9.10.4).  
 From this preliminary overview it is already clear that these letters stage a 
confrontation between Aristippus’ lifestyle of suave hedonism and a particularly ascetic 
version of Cynicism.6 We find this same version of Cynicism in most of the pseudonymous 
letters of Crates and Diogenes of Sinope, one of which is also addressed to Aristippus 
(Diogenes 32). The confrontation in our letters begins in the exchange with Antisthenes, 
where Aristippus, rather than responding earnestly to Antisthenes’ principled criticism, 
deflects it with irony. It continues in the exchange with Aeschines, which is explicitly 
formulated to display the merits of Aristippus’ behaviour. It is Aristippus’ good relationship 
with a tyrant, after all, and not Antisthenes’ relationships with barley sellers, which will save 
the lives of the Locrians. Finally, this confrontation reaches its climax in the exchange with 
Simon, who was probably not a historical figure, but rather a fictional hero of late Cynicism.7 
Simon converts Antisthenes’ verbal lashing into the threat of a physical one, but once again 
Aristippus refuses to engage with him seriously: he replaces the real grounds for Simon’s 
indignation with an argument about his cobbling business, and then reduces Simon’s 
principled objections to the economics of cutting leather. 
 Now that I have outlined these letters’ content, let me return to my first question: 
What do these letters contribute to the scholarship on Aristippus? By way of answering, I 
should explain that according to a recent article by Mann, ‘There is nothing to Aristippus’ 
philosophy besides the way he lives his life. That life is not to be explained, but shown.’8 
This contrast between Aristippus’ philosophical performance and the articulate theories of 
philosophers such as Aristotle recurs throughout the scholarship, going back at least to the 
1890s, when von Arnim, Natorp and Gomperz spoke of Aristippus as a Lebenskunstler 
(‘artist of living’) rather than a Wissenschaftler (‘scientist’) (on this distinction see also 
Güthenke, this volume).9 One reason to be suspicious of this distinction is that it projects onto 
fourth-century philosophy nineteenth-century debates about the study of classical antiquity, 
whether it ought to be a professional ‘science’ or a paradigm for personal and social 
transformation. But we need not consign Aristippean ethics to ‘artful’ inarticulacy simply 
                                                 
6 Hodkinson (2007) 287 and 298 notes that juxtaposing different viewpoints is one things epistolary 
collections do well.  
7 See Sellars (2003b). 
8 Mann (1996) 119. 
9 Natorp (1895) 904, Arnim (1898) 23, Gomperz (1905) 213. Compare Giannantoni (1958) 23, 42-54, 
70-73. 
because he prefers characteristic ways of speaking and acting to systematic theory. If we are 
to appreciate the stature accorded to him by the history of philosophy, we must at least 
attempt to translate his various performances into some sort of verbal analysis.  
 First we must say a few words about how these letters capture Aristippus’ 
performative lifestyle. If we want to move past the dichotomy between showing and telling, 
we should look for something intelligible that unifies Aristippus’ way of speaking and acting. 
Here we may recall Demetrius’ often-cited line that ‘It’s almost as a likeness of his own soul 
that each person writes a letter’ (De eloc. 227). This obviously suggests that some sort of 
psychical paradigm manifests itself in epistolary writing, but this paradigm remains a 
polysemous metaphor. In order to clarify it, I will initially suggest that we are dealing with 
the dispositions, intentions and aspirations that make up the letter-writer’s character. These 
can be plotted along a narrative of character development, as in the seventeen letters ascribed 
to Chion of Heraclea.10 Or they can be varied by situation, as in the letters of Socrates. The 
important point is that, whether the character is developing or static, at issue is a recognizable 
core of selfhood, which is felt to capture something important about an exemplary lifestyle. 
 Now let us return to the details of Aristippus’ exchange with Antisthenes. In the 
course of Antisthenes’ brief letter, he packs in an abundance of value terms. As we saw 
above, he begins by saying what ‘the philosopher’ would do. It is worth quoting the 
remainder of this brief letter in its entirety (Epistle 8): 
 
But you think that where the good man excels is in being able to get wealth 
and have powerful friends. Yet neither is wealth necessary, nor, if it were 
necessary, would it be good if acquired in this way, nor can the many and 
ignorant be friends, especially when they’re tyrants to boot. So I’d advise you 
to leave Syracuse and Sicily. But if, as some say, you’re crazy for pleasure and 
stuck to things that don’t suit prudent men, depart to Anticyra, and a drink of 
hellebore will help. It’s much better than Dionysius’ wine. Wine makes you 
wholly mad, this stops madness. You’d be as much better than you are now as 
sanity and prudence are better than sickness and folly. Be well.  
244.5-19 Malherbe 
 
                                                 
10 See Düring (1951) Konstan and Mitsis (1990) Trapp (2006) 44-46. 
In this passage Antisthenes does not so much lay out an argument as hope that Aristippus will 
recognize himself in the value terms he uses – on the positive side, philosophy, moral 
goodness, sanity and prudence; on the negative, sickness, folly, madness and loss of control – 
and that he will draw the appropriate conclusions. Each of these terms implies a vague 
multitude of dispositions to feel and act, as Antisthenes sometimes makes explicit. For 
example, he suggests someone committed to ‘philosophical’ behaviour will be repulsed by 
Dionysius’ luxurious, bibulous symposia. This is a common way of conceiving of character 
in Greek philosophy, and appears for example in the works of Aristotle. Precisely what 
makes our purposive actions belong to us, Aristotle suggests in the Ethics, is that they arise 
from the dispositions making up our character.11 When people do not act according to these 
dispositions, he adds in the Poetics, it makes for unintelligible drama, because the characters’ 
thoughts and intentions no longer serve to explain their actions.12 Antisthenes’ gambit is that 
Aristippus, thinking about the intellectual and emotional commitments implied by these value 
terms, and considering how they correspond to his own dispositions, will decide that the only 
intelligible thing for someone like him to do is to abandon Dionysius’ hospitality. In other 
words, as he enacts the plot of his life, he should conclude that this character, this prudent, 
philosophical, good and healthy-minded man, cannot intelligibly act otherwise. 
 This is Antisthenes’ persuasive strategy, but of course it does not work. One reason 
for this failure is that, insofar as Aristippus displays some concern for stability of character, 
his commitments are not those Antisthenes wants to impute to him. Consider the beginning of 
his responding letter. 
 
My unhappiness, Antisthenes, is by no means moderate. How am I not going 
to be unhappy, since I live with a tyrant, eating and drinking extravagantly 
every day, being anointed with the most delicious perfume, and trailing a long 
Tarentine cloak? And no one will save me from Dionysius’ cruelty, who holds 
me like a hostage – not a nobody, but a steward of Socratic discourses! And 
like I said, he feeds me, anoints me, and dresses me like this and neither fears 
the gods’ justice nor feels shame before men, treating me like this! And now 
it’s gone from bad to worse, when he gave me three Sicilian women of 
                                                 
11 See esp. NE 3.1-5. 
12 See esp. Po. 6, 15 with the commentary of Halliwell (1986) 138-67. For a fascinating elaboration of 
what Aristotle leaves unsaid in both works, see Ricoeur (1990) 89-94 and 140-68. 
outstanding beauty and a pile of money. And I don’t know when this man will 
stop doing these things!  
 244.21-246.4 Malherbe 
 
I have quoted at length in order to communicate Aristippus’ tone and perspective. Of course 
it would be ludicrous to read his character straight from his words, which are dripping with 
irony. But if we borrow Vlastos’ interpretation of Socratic irony, we can propose that 
Aristippus’ words present a very simple riddle.13 The gist of Vlastos’ position is that an 
ironist’s words are intended to carry a meaning other than what is customary. This may be the 
opposite of the customary meaning, as when we say, ‘What a beautiful day!’ when it is 
hailing.14 For the moment, let us assume this is what Aristippus is doing: he means more or 
less the opposite of what he is saying. So when he says he is very miserable, he means he is 
very happy; when he says the tyrant is cruel, he means beneficent; and when he says things 
have gone from bad to worse, he means things just keep getting better! 
 We can formulate how this evaluation of the situation relates to Aristippus’ sense of 
selfhood by deepening our engagement with Aristotelian thought, this time in its creative 
reappropriation by Ricoeur. I said before that character helps determine what a certain sort of 
person will do in a certain situation: it is what guarantees that his behaviour expresses who he 
is. We can now add that this grounding of choice in character is just one aspect of an 
individual’s evaluative orientation, which at its horizon encompasses his entire life. Aristotle 
argues that people ought to clarify the sort of life they want to live so that they can orient all 
their deliberation and action toward achieving this flourishing life.15 Ricoeur suggests that 
such an orientation actually does emerge from each individual’s oscillating shifts in 
perspective, during reflection, deliberation, and purposive action, between comprehensive 
goals, habitual practices and particular choices and outcomes.16 For example, Aristippus 
might take ‘pleasant living’ to be his comprehensive goal, he might habitually prefer the 
                                                 
13 I draw on theories of Socratic irony because they are among the most fully developed theories of 
irony available and because Aristippus’ beliefs and interests loosely resemble those of his one-time 
companion. However, I acknowledge that there are also differences. I develop and diversify my 
interpretation of Aristippean irony later in this chapter. 
14 Strictly speaking, Vlastos (1987) only speaks of ‘complex irony’ as ‘riddling.’  
15 NE 1.1-2. For the practicalities of this orientation, see especially 3.1-5, 6.1-5. 
16 (1990) 152-80. 
company of tyrants to tradesmen, and he might particularize this goal and these habits by 
choosing to eat this fish now, visit a courtesan later, etc. The orientation which arises from 
such a network is an important aspect of our sense of who we are. Taylor puts this concisely: 
‘To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is formed by the 
commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try 
to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I 
endorse or oppose.’17  
With this in mind, we can see more clearly that Aristippus’ ironic response is a 
powerful expression of his identity. Later in the same letter, he writes,  
 
For the madness by which I thoughtlessly came to these absurdities, I curse 
myself as I deserve, that I should never leave these evils, since at this age and 
appearing to have some sense I still didn’t want to be hungry, cold, in ill 
repute, and to grow a long beard.  
246.18-23 Malherbe  
 
Here, by ironic negation, Aristippus lays claim to the very characteristics Antisthenes 
summoned him to identify with – but he orients them toward a different conception of 
happiness. When he acknowledges his ‘madness,’ ‘thoughtlessness,’ and lack of ‘good 
sense,’ of course he means that he both values and believes he possesses the contraries of 
these characteristics: a healthy mind, good counsel and sound sense. For the ‘evils’ that he 
mentions are of course goods, namely the tyrant’s friendship, elegant clothes, fine food, 
beautiful women and delicious perfumes; and he is employing his healthy mind, good counsel 
and good sense to pursue and preserve these goods. In affirming these excellences of 
character with reference to these general dispositions and particular choices, Aristippus 
expresses who he is. This identity is further articulated in his statement that he shares 
‘Socratic teachings’ with Dionysius, and in his assurance to Aeschines that, through his 
friendship with Dionysius, he will save the Locrians. Aristippus is not just a versatile servant 
of his own bodily pleasures, he is also someone who embraces philosophical reflection and 
can be counted on to help his friends. 
 By now I hope that the way in which these letters present Aristippus’ lifestyle is 
becoming clearer: we are not dealing with a developmental narrative, but rather a consistent 
                                                 
17 (1989) 27. 
ethical orientation which expresses itself in actions or sayings and gives them meaning.18 I 
promised also to consider how this life articulates an Aristippean ethics, and we have made 
some progress in that direction as well. For we have not only explained how the interaction of 
comprehensive, intermediate and particular goals defines any given life, we have also begun 
to fill in this scheme with particularly Aristippean values: at the most comprehensive level, a 
life of refined pleasure; at the intermediate level, the excellences of sanity, good counsel, 
good sense and helping your friends; at the particular level, a series of pleasant experiences, 
unruffled management of criticism and effective action on Aeschines’ behalf.  
 On the other hand, it would be foolish to make too much of these results. It is all very 
well to say that life is about refined pleasure achieved through sanity, wisdom and integrity, 
but the real mystery of Aristippus’ life is how he makes these things come together. This is 
what the real mystery of Aristippus’ life, which Gomperz calls Aristippus’ ‘virtuosity in the 
art of living’.19 And it is not yet clear whether these letters resolve this mystery. So at this 
point let us turn to another aspect of the letters, namely their humorous dimension.  
 
II. IRONY AND HUMOUR 
Aristippus’ brand of humour is very unusual in pseudonymous philosophers’ epistles. The 
letters ascribed to Socrates, Diogenes, Crates, or Heraclitus share Aristippus’ low level of 
doctrinal subtlety and argumentative rigor, but combine this with an oppressive seriousness 
of which Aristippus is happily innocent. This calls for some sort of commentary. What 
difference can it make when a philosopher addresses substantial ethical topics with humour 
rather than painstaking gravity or hortatory vehemence? At least three possibilities occur to 
me. First, in company with the irony to which it is akin, humour may imply claims about the 
status of knowledge. Second, humour may affect the attitudes of listeners, and thus help 
persuade them to agree with you, to like you, and perhaps to do what you want. Third, 
humour may encourage reflection. Here I will try to understand Aristippus’ irony and humour 
as elements in dynamic interaction with ethical beliefs and goals. This will involve 
experimentation with very charitable readings, which will require qualification later; but it 
will also lay the groundwork for the third section.  
                                                 
18 This bears some similarity to what Dickson (2009) proposes for the ‘‘autobiographical’’ content of 
Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations.  
19 See n. 000 19 above. 
 Let me begin by revisiting the scholarship on Socratic irony, which again provides a 
suggestive template for Aristippus. While irony is not always humorous, we have already 
seen that Aristippus’ tendency not to say what he means involves jokes at the expense of 
Antisthenes and Simon. Back in his response to Antisthenes, for example, he advises his 
recipient to ‘Bathe and drink from the Nine Spouts fountain, and wear the same filthy cloak 
summer and winter, as befits a free man living democratically’ (246.10-13). Obviously 
Aristippus does not think that these are marks of ‘freedom’, and part of his intention is to 
mock Antisthenes for thinking so. Earlier I suggested that Aristippus’ irony amounts to 
saying the contrary of what he means, but now I would like to observe that it is often more 
complicated than that. As Nehamas writes,  
Irony often insinuates that something is taking place inside you that your 
audience is not allowed to see, but it does not always entail that you see it 
yourself. Irony often communicates that only a part of a picture is visible to an 
audience, but it does not always entail that the speaker sees the whole. 
Sometimes, it does not even imply that a whole picture exists.20  
We can explain Nehamas’ claim by contrasting Antisthenes and Simon with Aristippus. 
Antisthenes is so vehemently certain he ‘sees the whole picture’ that he not only tells 
Aristippus what a ‘good’ and ‘philosophical’ man ought to do, he also urges him to ‘cure’ 
himself with a poisonous ‘medicine’. Simon is even ready to ‘instruct’ Aristippus with a 
leather whip. By contrast, Aristippus makes no real effort to persuade either Antisthenes or 
Simon of the soundness of his own beliefs. In the text that I have just quoted, for example, he 
obviously means to contest the meaning of ‘freedom’ and its relations to tyranny, democracy, 
self-indulgence and self-denial. In fact, he emphasizes this disagreement in the closing lines 
of the letter: ‘Meanwhile keep going to talk with Simon the cobbler. There neither exists nor 
is likely to exist anyone better for you in terms of wisdom. As for me, I’ve been forbidden to 
approach tradesmen, since I’m under someone else’s power’ (246.29-33, italics mine). Here 
again Aristippus mocks Antisthenes’ conceptions of freedom and power. So why does he not 
explain his own beliefs about these things? Of course, part of the reason may be that he 
considers Antisthenes and Simon beneath instruction, or beyond persuasion. But it is also 
worth asking whether Aristippus has a more fundamental reason for refusing to articulate his 
position. 
                                                 
20 Nehamas (1998) 67.  
  Consider another passage from his letter to Antisthenes: ‘It’s good of you to be upset 
over others’ unhappiness. I too will take pleasure in your happiness, so that I’ll seem to 
reciprocate and repay the favour’ (246.4-7). Here Aristippus does not simply mean the 
contrary of what he says. For example, he may indeed mean that Antisthenes acts badly to 
sympathize with him, since in fact he requires no sympathy; but it is dubious whether he 
cares about Antisthenes’ so-called ‘happiness’. And the clause about reciprocity is humorous 
nonsense, since it rests on premises about their respective happiness that Aristippus does not 
accept. But that does not mean it is merely nonsense. By reducing the entire exchange to 
absurdity, we could say that Aristippus is stepping back from this entire business of arguing 
about who is happier than who, especially since at issue is not justice or courage, but diet, 
dress, perfume, sex and everything that falls under the heading of temperance. He is not 
necessarily denying the fruitfulness of reflective conversations, since he mentions that he is a 
‘steward of Socratic discourses’; nor is he suspending evaluative judgment, since we have 
seen that he has a coherent ethical orientation. But he deflates Antisthenes’ attack without 
justifying himself or attempting to persuade his antagonist. It is just possible, if we return to 
Nehamas’ conception of irony, that part of the reason for which Aristippus adopts this 
strategy is because he does not ‘see the whole picture’, and is not certain it can be seen. In 
other words, it is possible that Aristippus feels he is happy, but is not confident he can 
systematically articulate the nature of that happiness. This suggestion rests on thin evidence 
within the letters, but it receives support from the dogmatic scepticism we know the Cyrenaic 
school professed. The Aristippus of these letters would then be what Mann proposes the 
historical Aristippus was, someone who believed that ‘philosophical argumentation is 
inadequate for settling philosophical disputes’.21 This could partially explain his bemused 
disengagement from the arguments Antisthenes and Simon are attempting to start.22  
 I turn now from theories of irony to theories of humour, which will open up two 
additional interpretive avenues. The first begins from Freud’s theory of ‘tendentious’ jokes, 
in which the humourist expresses aggression toward the ‘butt’ of the joke for the amusement 
of himself and some third-person audience.23 For example, look again at Aristippus’ 
                                                 
21 Mann (1996) 113. 
22 My suggestion for Aristippus bears a superficial similarity to Critchley’s risus purus in 2002: 93-
111. Much of Aristippus’ humour also fits with Freud’s musings in ‘‘Humour,’’ SE 21: 160-66, which 
inspires Critchley’s position.  
23 SE 8: 100. 
humorous self-criticism: ‘For the madness by which I thoughtlessly came to these absurdities, 
I curse myself as I deserve, that I should never leave these evils, since at this age and 
appearing to have some sense I still didn’t want to be hungry, cold, in ill repute, and to grow 
a long beard.’ Aristippus’ intended audience should enjoy a smile with Aristippus against 
Antisthenes, since Antisthenes willingly suffers cold, hunger, disrepute and unkempt hair for 
the sake of his highly contestable principles. Freud thinks tendentious jokes require an 
audience because the humourist himself invests a lot of effort in overcoming the inhibition of 
his aggressive impulses, the liberation of which the audience can enjoy without any such 
effort. Humourist and audience then share the total upwelling of pleasure from this liberated 
aggression.24 But this is a one-dimensional view of humour. More than just the pleasurable 
liberation of hostility, what Aristippus elicits from his audience is a feeling of intimacy 
created by shared knowledge and attitudes. Cohen argues,  
When you offer your joke, you solicit [your auditor’s] knowledge, you elicit it, 
in fact, virtually against their will, and they find themselves contributing the 
background that will make the joke work. Thus they join you. And they join 
you again, if the joke works, in their response, and the two of you find 
yourselves a community, a community of amusement.25  
In Aristippus’ case, the audience must grasp that his ‘curse’ is more like a ‘prayer’, that in 
saying he ‘deserves’ what he gets, he’s boasting rather than acknowledging his faults, and 
that the ‘good sense’ he mentions should direct him to choose what he ironically labels evils 
(fine foods and beautiful women), not what he labels goods (rigorous austerity). The audience 
must not only understand all this, they must share the attitudes presumed by this double-
speak. Simon the Cobbler, for example, would not find this funny. But for those who do, the 
humour creates a feeling of connection and sympathy, and can therefore contribute to 
Aristippus’ ability to disarm critics and ingratiate himself with potential patrons. In other 
words, this mode of philosophical discussion could be an element of Aristippus’ mysteriously 
felicitous ‘art of living’, which somehow combines integrity and dignity with hedonism and 
the cultivation of the wealthy and powerful. 
                                                 
24 SE 8: 155-56. Ancient theorists of humour were also keenly aware of its aggressive aspect 
(Halliwell (2008) 19-38 and 264-331).  
25 1999: 40. Compare Gaut (1998) 52-54 on the ‘‘attitudinal structure’’ manifested by a series of 
jokes. 
 It is also possible that Aristippus’ humour has a third, more reflective purpose. One 
function of humour can be to disrupt normative ways of thinking and behaving. This begins 
at the semantic level, where we have already seen Aristippus’ reduction of ethical debate to 
nonsense. Here it is worth mentioning Freud’s argument that there exists a pure delight in 
absurdity, since it liberates the speaker and sympathetic listeners from the laborious task of 
making sense.26 But more important is the capacity of jokes, as Douglas has emphasized, to 
express alternatives to the norms active in any situation.27 Bracht Branham has applied this 
theory to the Cynic Diogenes, whose antinomian antics, ranging from syllogisms that infer 
the legitimacy of cannibalism to an oration punctuated by shitting on stage, pretty obviously 
represent alternative ways of configuring accepted values.28 Freud actually calls anti-
institutional humour ‘Cynic’, so it is ironic that in our epistles it is Antisthenes’ way of 
choosing friends and moderating enjoyment that is closer to the norm. Aristippus’ humour 
may help listeners not only to reject Antisthenes’ austerity, but also to accept his own 
unabashed hedonism. Even a sympathetic audience, for example, may not otherwise be ready 
to admit that they would like to ‘stay with a tyrant, eating and drinking luxuriously every day, 
anointing themselves with some of the most exquisite perfumes, and trailing long Tarentine 
robes’. Aristippus’ choice to communicate these desires via humour could allow his audience 
recognize their intuitive hedonism. Hence we could propose that Aristippus’ humour not only 
creates the intimacy of shared attitudes, it might even lead his audience reflectively to affirm 
disavowed attitudes and consider re-organizing their values.29 
 We have now explored three ways of understanding the role humour plays in 
Aristippus’ ‘virtuosity in the art of living’. As an expression of irony, I suggested it could be 
a signal that Aristippus distrusts system-builders and dogmatism. As an expression of 
tendentious humour, it could connect him with an audience in the shared release of 
aggression and the shared intimacy of knowledge and attitudes. Finally, it could also be a 
way of encouraging listeners to consider whether they agree with Aristippus. All of these are 
possibilities for a charitable reading of Aristippean ethics in these epistles.  
 But at this point I should acknowledge that it is hard to pin down the third-person 
audience the jokes require. If this is a private letter, is the audience imaginary? Are we to 
                                                 
26 Freud SE 8: 125-27. 
27 Douglas (1968) 361-76.  
28 Branham (1996), which draws on enlightening discussions in Branham (1989) esp. 11-63 
29 Compare Gaut (1998) 66-67.  
surmise that Aristippus wrote the letters with publication in mind? Both are possible, but we 
can also solve this puzzle by ascribing the audience, like the humour, to the epistolographer 
behind the fiction. Next I will focus on how the author’s creative reimagining of Aristippus 
serves his own subtle purposes.  
 
III. THE EPISTOLOGRAPHER’S PERSPECTIVE 
In order to investigate the epistolographer’s perspective I must say a little more about the 
epistles’ probable authorship and date.30 Two discrete corpora make up most of the Socratic 
collection. First, letters 1-7 are ascribed to Socrates. They are written in smooth and urbane 
Attic, focus zealously on banal moralizing and rely heavily on Xenophon and Plato’s 
Apology. Letters 8-27, by contrast, are ascribed to Socrates’ real or fictional disciples. They 
mix slightly awkward Attic with what, probably due to accidents of transmission, looks like 
inconsistent Doric. They do not present any unified ethical outlook, much less concern 
themselves with straight-forward moralizing. Rather, they appear more concerned with 
biographical and antiquarian ornamentation. Their author draws not only on Xenophon and 
Plato’s Apology, but also on many other Platonic dialogues and letters, works of Plutarch and 
on some sort of biographical and anecdotal collection such as that of Diogenes Laertius.  
 The letters of Aristippus belong to this second corpus, the provenance of which 
remains murky. Malherbe lumps them in with almost all pseudonymous philosophers’ letters 
under the heading ‘Cynic Epistles’.31 But given the diversity and chronological expanse of 
ancient Cynicism, this category would be of little explanatory value even if there were reason 
to believe our letters were written by self-identifying Cynics.32 Obens and Sykutris are more 
convincing in ascribing them to ‘a Platonizing orator or a rhetorically schooled Platonist’ of 
the second or third centuries CE.33 Of obvious relevance for this ascription are the exercises 
in ‘characterization’ (ethopoiia) and ‘impersonation’ (prosopopoiia) in all the surviving 
elementary handbooks of rhetorical education from the Roman empire. In these exercises 
students were asked what a certain sort of character would say in a certain situation, for 
                                                 
30 With this paragraph see Sykutris (1931) 981-87; (1933) 112-21.  
31 Malherbe (1977) 27-34.  
32 Pace Köhler’s (1928) remark that ‘Die kynische Tendenz in den meisten Briefen is unverkennber’ 
(5), Sykutris (1933) rightly notes ‘eine gewisse Abneigung gegen das grobe Auftreten und den 
Schmutz der Kyniker (trotz 20)’ (113). 
33 Quotation from Sykutris (1933) 121. Cf. Obens (1912) 6 and 66-78; and Köhler (1928) 4-5.  
example a man when leaving his wife for a journey; or what a historical or mythical character 
should have said on a particular occasion, for example Alexander before the battle of Issus. 
These exercises could also take epistolary form.34 Well-educated adults sometimes continued 
to produce ‘characterized’ or ‘impersonated’ speeches and letters, the object of which was the 
display of wit, erudition and mental agility.35 Our author’s handling of Attic and Doric, 
neither of which resembles the spoken Greek of the period, his numerous literary and 
philosophical allusions, and his liberal use of obscure personal and place names all help to 
situate his letters in this domain of conspicuous and competitive paideia.36  
 Looking at the letters as specimens of rhetorical epideixis opens up several 
interpretive possibilities. The first is that their author uses Aristippus as a mouthpiece to 
sketch a critique of Cynicism. This would be an opportunity not only to display his 
philosophical learning, but also – behind a veil of ‘figured speech’37 – to defend his own 
lifestyle and criticize its real or imaginary detractors. After all, the Cynics’ radical notion of 
‘freedom’ excluded reliance on Roman patrons, not only Sicilian tyrants; and their radical 
notion of ‘nature’ excluded the laborious education and exquisite satisfactions of imperial 
sophistry, not only Aristippus’ carnal luxury. Speaking of Aelius Aristides’ critique of Plato, 
Anderson writes, ‘As so often the sophist is in his element in an imaginary court, winning 
hands down against his long-deceased but remarkably resilient rival.’38 Similarly, 
Antisthenes’ Cynic position, poorly defended by its boorish proponent, is annihilated by our 
learned epistolographer. Cynicizers of his own time are swept away by the same attack.  
 But our author’s purposes are surely not exhausted in a serious critique of Cynicism, 
which corresponds to the arguments that I reconstructed in section one. We should also 
reconsider the letters’ tendentious humour, which I explored in section two. Insofar as Cynics 
                                                 
34 The surviving elementary rhetorical handbooks are assembled and translated by Kennedy 2003. The 
extension of ethopoiia into letter-writing is suggested by Theon, Exercises, 115 and Nicolaus the 
Sophist, Preliminary Exercises, 67. On the extent of common acquaintance with Plato in the second 
sophistic, see de Lacy (1974). 
35 See Whitmarsh (2005) 20-21 with further references. 
36 On the epistles’ use of obscure names see Sykutris (1933) 115-16.  
37 On logoi eskhematismenoi see Whitmarsh (2001) 57-59.  
38 Anderson (1993) 141. The reference is to Aristides’ Or. 2, Against Plato in Defence of Rhetoric. 
Among our author’s probable contemporaries Lucian (esp. Vit. Auct., Herm., Symp., DMeretr. 10) and 
Alciphron (esp. 3.9, 4.7, 4.17) come closer to our letters’ combination of erudition, humour and 
criticism of philosophy and philosophers. 
remain the butt of these jokes, we can say that it is now the epistolographer rather than 
Aristippus who shares with his audience the pleasure of disinhibited aggression and the 
intimacy of common judgments. But is Aristippus himself immune from this implicit 
criticism? Granted, the author seems to imply that hedonism, humour and accommodation to 
the power structures of the real world are better than asceticism, self-righteous vehemence 
and an inhuman crusade to ‘free’ oneself from every sort of cultural constraint. To this extent 
Aristippus is recuperated as a model for the epistolographer’s own aspirations. But even if he 
treats Aristippus more sympathetically than the other philosophers, we need not take him to 
endorse Aristippus’ beliefs and lifestyle wholeheartedly. 
 Indeed there are grounds for thinking that he intends to present Aristippus’ ironic 
disengagement from principled debate, which I earlier suggested was an expression of 
epistemic diffidence, in a rather less favourable light. For example, Aristippus implicitly 
claims that friendship with Dionysius is a great thing, since it both provides him with luxury 
and enables him to save Aeschines’ Locrian friends. But anyone who has read Plato’s 
Seventh Letter – as our author probably has – might find Aristippus smugly overconfident. 
Does he really think a quick mind and a good sense of humour will allow him to navigate the 
intrigues of tyrannical Syracuse? Perhaps we should see Aristippus’ glib nonchalance as the 
flip-side to Antisthenes’ vehement asceticism: both are immoderately one-sided, so the 
extravagant promises each makes about securing happiness are laughable. 
 It would then be significant that when we last see Aristippus in this collection, in 
letter 27, he is dying on the island of Lipara. His daughter has been sending him requests for 
help with the Cyrenean government, but Aristippus has not been able to provide any. ‘I 
received a series of letters from you,’ he says,  
 
in which you asked me to come to you as soon as possible in Cyrene. You say 
you’re not being well treated by the inspectors, nor is your husband able to 
handle the matter, since he’s a very respectful type and unaccustomed to 
political troubles. I myself was trying to get Dionysius to release me to sail to 
you when fate intervened, and I fell ill at Lipara.  
282.2-9 Malherbe 
 
First, what is Aristippus doing on Lipara? The island is off the north coast of Sicily, the 
opposite of the direction Aristippus should be sailing if he wants to return to Cyrene. This 
may be the epistolographer’s little joke: one meaning of the adjective liparos is ‘rich, 
comfortable, easy’,39 just like Aristippus. This is not the only possible pun in the letter. The 
phrase I have translated ‘fell ill’ (malakōs eschon) could also be rendered ‘became cowardly, 
soft, indulgent, like a kinaidos’: the adjective malakos has many negative connotations.40 
Moreover, the name of Aristippus daughter is Arētē, which is close enough to aretē, or 
‘virtue’, to be an easy pun. So, dying in his flaccid and unctuous luxury, Aristippus receives 
an imploring letter from his daughter, but cannot go to ‘Virtue’s’ aid. She has been asking for 
practical help, and what he offers her are some platitudes about the preciousness of the 
philosophy he has imparted and some bizarre advice about moving to Athens and playing 
Aristippus to Xanthippe’s Socrates. It is tempting to read this as so much gaseous blathering: 
unable at this key moment to manipulate Dionysius, engage with the political actors in 
Cyrene, or help his daughter and grandson, Aristippus falls back on the comfortingly vague 
optimism of his world of words. 
 So we need not take Aristippus’ cheerful evasion of principled debate as an 
expression of epistemic diffidence. Rather, his facile optimism may be another object of the 
epistolographer’s subtle and humorous criticism. Aristippean hedonism is better than Cynic 
austerity, but suffers from the same impractical one-sidedness.41 The only person with a 
realistic and practical understanding of the situations in these letters is the author – and of 
course you, dear readers, if you get the jokes.  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
I began from the suggestion in the scholarship that Aristippus was an ‘artist of living’ rather 
than a thinker, so that nothing substantial could be said about his ethics. The conception of 
philosophy as an ‘art’ is most often associated with the European tradition after Nietzsche. It 
frequently relies on the premise that ‘truth’ in general is an intersubjective construction, from 
which the ‘authentic’ individual must emerge through a courageous act of will, 
transformative commitment to libidinal drives, or spiritual exercise and self-elaboration. 
These premises are foreign to ancient philosophy. Nevertheless, there are strong lines of 
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41 George Boys-Stones suggests to me that this confirms that our epistolographer has Platonist 
leanings: Antisthenes and Aristippus between them stand for the bankruptcy of Stoic, Cynic, and 
Epicurean philosophy as alternatives to Platonism.  
resemblance and influence between ancient philosophical ‘crafts of living’ and post-
Nietzschean ideals of artful self-creation.42 Most important for our purposes, ancient ethics 
generally aims to articulate and satisfy inchoate existential impulses through the simultaneous 
development of reflective theories and deliberate manners of speaking, thinking, feeling and 
acting. Artful behaviour and forceful reasoning are thus complementary, not disjunctive. 
 I have argued that the artfulness of Aristippus in the Socratic epistles lends itself to 
discursive explanation in several ways. In my first section I fleshed out the character and 
evaluative orientation implied by these letters. Since this did not seem fully to capture 
Aristippus’ artistry, I next focused on the letters’ unusually humorous dimension. The 
epistemic implications and interpersonal effects of Aristippean wit and irony enriched our 
appreciation of his philosophy, but also pointed toward the epistolographer behind the fiction. 
Thus I concluded by addressing how this creative reimagination serves its author, who both 
appropriates Aristippus’ beliefs and jokes and implicitly tops them with his playful critique. 
 Not all these readings are compatible, so where does that leave us? It would be a 
mistake to try to pull together all the loose ends in this analysis, since one of the 
characteristics of biography-as-philosophy is that it does not lend itself to the closed 
systematicity of theory. Instead, it presents its readers with a core of beliefs and tendencies 
amenable to various levels of analysis and critique. In pseudonymous works like these, the 
perspective of the real author and his readers adds an additional layer of complexity. In this 
particular case, there is no reason to deny that even the epistolographer and his notional 
audience could toggle between admiring Aristippus’ versatility and wit and looking down on 
his shortcomings. This indeterminacy is far from confirming Mann’s judgment that 
Aristippean philosophy ‘is not to be explained, but shown.’ This is so only if we think that 
‘philosophical explanation’ necessarily aims at producing a single and definitive 
interpretation. If we accept instead that philosophy may aim to explain a variety of lines of 
thought provoked by ethically engaged behaviour, then we should say that there is a great 
deal to be explained in Aristippus’ behaviour in these letters. With appropriate modifications, 
the same will be true of much of the semi-fictional and semi-biographical material that makes 
up our evidence for the historical Aristippus. 
                                                 
42 Nehamas (1998) explores some of these. For broader discussion of ancient philosophies as crafts of 
living, see Hadot (1995) and (2002), Sellars (2003a). Foucault (2005), (2010) and (2011) are also well 
worth reading in this regard, especially since they straddle the fuzzy line between scholarship on 
ancient philosophy and ‘creative’ modern philosophy. 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Primary texts. With the exception of the following, I have used the standard editions. All 
translations are my own, except I have consulted Malherbe for the Socratic epistles and used 
Costa’s translations of Lucian (with slight modifications). I give the pagination and line 
numbering from Malherbe, as I explain in n. 000 4. 
 
Costa, C. D. N., trans. (2005) Lucian: Selected Dialogues. Oxford.  
Düring, I. (1951) Chion of Heraclea: A Novel in Letters. Göterborg 
Hercher, R. (1885) Epistolographi Graeci. Paris. 
Kennedy, G. A., trans., (2003) Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and 
Rhetoric. Atlanta. 
Köhler, L. (1928) Die Briefe des Sokrates und der Sokratiker. Leipzig.  
Malherbe, A. J. (1977) The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition. Atlanta. 
 
2. Secondary texts 
Anderson, G. (1997) ‘Alciphron’s miniatures,’ ANRW II 34.3: 2188-2206.  
(1993) The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire. London.  
Arnim, H. von (1893) Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa. Mit einem Einleitung: Sophistik, 
Rhetorik, Philosophie in ihrem Kampf um die Jungendbildung. Berlin: Weidmann. 
Bentley, R. (1817 [orig. 1697]) A Dissertation upon the Epistles of Phalaris with an Answer 
to the Objections of the Hon. C. Boyle, to Which are Added Dr. Bentley’s Dissertation 
on the Epistles of Themistocles, Socrates, Euripides, and Others; and the Fables of 
Aesop, as Originally Printed; with Occasional Remarks on the Whole. A New 
Edition. London. 
Branham, R. B. (1996) ‘Defacing the currency: Diogenes’ rhetoric and the invention of 
Cynicism,’ in R. Bracht Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds.), The Cynics: The 
Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy. Berkeley, 81-104.  
(1989) Unruly Eloquence: Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions. Harvard. 
Cherniss, H. (1934) [review of Sykutris 1933], AJP 55.3: 289-90. 
Cohen, T. (1999) Jokes: Philosophical Thoughts on Laughing Matters. Chicago. 
Critchley, S. (2002) On Humour. Abingdon. 
Cronert, W. (1936) [Review of Sykutris 1933], Gnomon 12.3: 146-52 
de Lacy, P. (1974) ‘Plato and the intellectual life of the second century A.D.,’ in G. 
Bowersock (ed.), Approaches to the Second Sophistic. University Park, Pa., 4-10. 
Dickson, K. (2008) ‘Oneself as others: Aurelius and autobiography,’ Arethusa 42.1: 99-125 
Douglas, M. (1968) ‘The social control of cognition: Some factors in joke perception,’ Man 
n.s. 3.3: 361-76.  
Foucault, M. (2011) The Courage of Truth. The Government of Self and Others II. Lectures 
at the Collège de France 1983-1984, ed. F. Gros., trans. G. Burchell. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
(2010) The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-
1983, ed. F. Gros, trans. G. Burchell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
(2005) The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-
1982, ed. F. Gros, trans. G. Burchell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Freud, S. (1960) The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud. Volume VIII (1905): Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, trans. J. 
Strachey, A. Freud, A. Strachey, A. Tyson. London. 
S. Freud, (1961) ‘Humour,’ SE 21: 160-66. 
Gaut, B. (1998) ‘Just joking: The ethics and aesthetics of humour,’ Philosophy and Literature 
22.1: 55-68. 
Giannantoni, G. (1990) Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae. 4 vols. Naples.  
(1958) I Cirenaici: raccolta delle fonti antiche. Florence. 
Gleason, M. W. (1995) Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome. 
Princeton.  
Goldhill, S. (2002) Who Needs Greek? Contests in the Cultural History of Hellenism. 
Cambridge.  
(2009) ‘The anecdote: Exploring the boundaries between oral and literate 
performance in the second sophistic,’ in W. A. Johnson and H. N. Parker (eds.), 
Ancient Literacy: The Culture of Literacy in Greece and Rome. Oxford, 96-113. 
Gomperz, T. (1905 [orig. 1902]) Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Thought, vol. 2, trans. 
G. Berry. New York. 
Hadot, P. (2002) What Is Ancient Philosophy? Trans. Michael Chase. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press. 
(1995) Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, 
ed. Arnold Davidson, trans. Michael Chase. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Halliwell, S. (2008) Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early 
Christianity. Cambridge. 
(1986) Aristotle’s Poetics. London. 
Hodkinson, O. (2007) ‘Some advantages of the letter,’ in R. Morello and A. D. Morrison 
(eds.), Ancient Letters: Classical and Late Antique Epistolography. Oxford, 283-300. 
Kindstrand, J. F. (1986) ‘Diogenes Laertius and the ‘chreia’ tradition,’ Elenchos 7: 220-43. 
Konstan, D. and P. Mitsis, (1990) ‘Chion of Heraclea: A philosophical novel in letters,’ 
Apeiron 23.4: 257-79. 
Mann, W. R. (1996) ‘The life of Aristippus,’ AGPh 78: 97-119. 
Mansfeld, J. (1994) Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a 
Text. Leiden 
Mejer, J. (2006) ‘Ancient philosophy and the doxographical tradition,’ in M.-L. Gill and P. 
Pellegrin (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy. Oxford, 20-33. 
Momigliano, A. (1971) the Development of Greek Biography. Cambridge, Mass. 
Natorp, P. (1895) ‘Aristippos,’ RE 2.1: 902-906. 
Nehamas, A. (1998) The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault. 
Berkeley. 
Obens, G. (1912) Qua aetate Socratis et Socraticorum epistulae, quae dicuntur, scriptae sint. 
Münster. 
Orellius, I. C. (1815) Collectio epistolarum graecarum: graece et latine, recensuit notis 
priorum interpretum suisque illustravit Io. Conradius Orellius. Leipzig. 
Ricoeur, P. (1990) Oneself as Another, trans. K. Blamey. Chicago. 
Rosenmeyer, P. (2001) Ancient Epistolary Fictions: The Letter in Greek Literature. 
Cambridge. 
Schmitz, T. A. (2004) ‘Alciphron’s letters as a sophistic text,’ in B. E. Borg (ed.), Paideia: 
The World of the Second Sophistic. Berlin, 87-104.  
Sellars, J. (2003a) The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
(2003b) ‘Simon the Shoe-Maker and the problem of Socrates,’ CP 98: 207-16. 
Sykutris, J. (1933) Die Briefe des Sokrates und der Sokratiker. Paderborn.  
(1931) ‘Sokratikerbriefe,’ RE Suppl. 5.981-87. 
Syme, R. (1971) ‘Fraud and imposture,’ in K. von Fritz (ed.), Pseudepigrapha I. 
Pseudopythagorica – Lettres de Platon – Littérature pseudépigraphique juive. 
Geneva, 3-17. 
Taylor, C. (1989), The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge. 
Trapp, M. (2006), ‘Biography in letters; biography and letters,’ in B. McGing and J. 
Mossman (eds.), The Limits of Ancient Biography. Cardiff, 335-50. 
Tsouna-McKirahan, V. (1994) ‘The Socratic origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics,’ in P. 
Vander Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 367-
391. 
Vlastos, G. (1987) ‘Socratic irony,’ CQ New Series vol. 37 n. 1: 79-96. 
Whitmarsh, T. (2005) The Second Sophistic. Oxford.
  
 
